La Vere Kidman et ux v. Lavine H. White et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
La Vere Kidman et ux v. Lavine H. White et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nielseon, Conder and Hansen; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Barrie G. McKay; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent; Thomas Vuyk; Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kidman v. White, No. 9704 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4096
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTF l L 
LAVERE KIDMAN, et ux., . 1 - 1~62 
l 
Plaintiffs and Respandent.s .. ,. ---· ·------------··· 
VS. ,__,, ~ ... _, ;-,. Jme Court, Ut;h-
LA VINE H. WHITE, et al., 
Defendants and Appellant_, Case No. 
KEITH S. JONES, 
Third Party Plaintiff_, 
vs. 
WILLIAM E. WADE et ux., et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
9704 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County 
HONORABLE RAY VANCOTT, JR., JUDGE 
Nielsen, Conder and Hansen 
W. Eugene Hansen and 
Franklin D. Johnson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
McKAY AND BURTON 
BARRIE G. McKAY 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
THOMAS VUYK 
53 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CON'l"ENTS 
Page 
STA'fE:\IENT OF" THE CASE -------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .... 2 
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS ____________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------- 3 
ARGUMENT ________________________________ . ______ . ___ ----------------- 5 
POINTS 
I. The District Court correctly interpreted the two 
agreements of Lavine H. White with William 
E. Wade and Erma M. Wade. -------------------------- 5 
(A.) Both agreements clearly provide that 
Lavine H. White agrees to assume the 
Wades' obligation in full and not merely 
to pay a certain amount of money........... 6 
(B.) Both agreements clearly referred to an-
other instrument. Therefore, the original 
agreement and the instrument referred to 
must be considered and construed as one. 8 
II. The District Court did not consider parol evi-
dence but construed the agrements as a matter 
of law. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
III. Summary Judgment "\Yas proper because the 
agreements were not ambiguous so as to require 
. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
parol evidence to interpret them, and Lavine 
H. White had no meritorious defense. -------------- 14 
Conclusion ____ -------------- ________ .. __ _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __ 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Bell v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 23 C. App. (2d) 436; 
73 Pac. ( 2d) 662, 663 ( 1938) -------------------------- 9 
Cerino v. Oregon Physicians Service, 202 Ore. 47 4 ; 
276 Pac. ( 2d) 397, 401 -------------------------------------- 10 
Climate Control, Inc. v. Hill, 86 Ariz. 180; 342 
Pac. ( 2d) 854, 859 -------------------------------------------- 10 
Holbrook v. Fezio, 84 C. App. (2d) 700; 191 Pac. 
( 2d) 123, 124 ------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Mathis v. Madsen, I U. (2d) 46; 261 Pac. (2d) 952, 
9!>6 -----------------------------------------------------------------~-------- 9 
Miller v. Hancock, 67 U. 202; 246 Pac. 949, 953____ 9 
Oberg v. City of Los Angeles, 132 C. App. (2d) 
151; 281 Pac. ( 2d) 591, 596 ( 195!>) ---------------- 9 
Terrill v. Laney, 200 Okl. 308 193 Pac. (2d} 296, 
300 ( 1948) ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Whiting Stoker Co. Y. Chicago Stoker Corporation, 
171 Fed. ( 2d) 248, 2lil ( 1949) ---------------- 13, 15 
MISCELLANEOUS 
17 C.J .S. 1287 -····--------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Moore's Federal J>ractice, Section 56: lli -------·---·-····· 14 
.. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LA '""ERE KIDMAN, et ux., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents~ 
vs. 
LA 'TINE H. WHITE, et al., 
Defendants and Appellant~ 
KEITH S. JONES, 
Third Party Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
WILLIAM E. WADE et ux., et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
Case No. 
9704 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a contract and a cross-claim 
on a similar contract by the third party beneficiaries 
to effect collection of two notes that are claimed to be 
incorporated by reference into the contracts and are 
now in default. Both contracts were entered into by 
Lavine H. White and ''Tilliam E. Wade and Erma M. 
''r ade. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At pre-trial in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Ray 'ran Cott, Jr., construed 
the two agreements to incorporate the two notes and 
entered Summary Judgment in favor of the Kidmans 
and against Lavine H. White and against Keith S. 
Jones and the Wades, vvho admitted liability on the one 
note. This Summary Judgment was in the amount of 
$4,568.07, together with interest at the rate of six per 
cent per annum from ~larch 4, I960, to May I, I962, 
and at eight per cent thereafter until paid, and attor-
ney's fees in the amount of $7I4.68. The Court also 
entered Summary Judgment in favor of Keith S. Jones 
and against Lavine H. ''Thite and against the ''r ades, 
who admitted liability on the other note. This Summary 
Judgment was in the amount of $550.00, together with 
interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from 
March I, I960, to lVIay I, I962, and reasonable attor-
ney's fees in the amount of $195.00, and reimbursement 
for any amounts Keith S. Jones is required to pay on 
the Summray Judgment granted the Kidmans. 
Lavine H. White is now appealing from these two 
Summary Judgments. 
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondents contend that the District Court cor-
rectly construed the agreetnent of LaYine H. White 
to mean that she asstuned the obligation of the ''r ades 
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on the Conditional Sales Note to Kidmans and the 
obligation on the Promissory Note to Jones, and 
properly determined that she had no defense which had 
any merit or upon which reasonable men could differ. 
Therefore, the Summary Judgments should be affirmed. 
STATEMEN'f OF FACTS 
In appellant's Statement of Facts an assignment 
from Keith Jones to 'Villiam E. Wade and Erma M. 
''r ade has been quoted at length, but has no bearing on 
the issue raised on this appeal. Also appellant has left 
out of her Statement of Facts items that do have a 
bearing on the issue in question. Therefore, respondents 
set forth the Statement of Facts as follows: 
Keith Jones, in order to start a Drive-In business 
located at 3325 South 23rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
purchased some equipment from LaVere Kidman and 
Leah 0. Kidman, giving as security for the payment 
thereof a Conditional Sales Note, dated July 21, 1957, 
in the amount of $6,500.00, to be paid at the rate of 
$100.00 a month, with interest at six per cent, and 
providing that in the case of default the total amount 
still outstanding would become immediately due, and 
for attorney's fees if suit was necessary to effect col-
lection of the note. ( R. 4-6) . 
Keith Jones made all payments as they came due 
(R. 31) until the principal had been reduced to 
$5,408.72. (R. 8). 
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On March 31, 1959, William F. Wade and Erma 
M. Wade purchased the Drive-In business from Keith 
S. Jones, giving as part of the consideration therefor 
their agreement to assume and perform Keith S. Jones' 
obligations on the said Conditional Sales Note (R. 7-
9}, and also gave to Keith S. Jones their Promissory 
Note in the amount of $641.28, which provided for 
payment of $25.00 or more a month, with interest at 
the rate of six per cent, and in case of default provided 
for attorney's fees and acceleration of due date on out-
standing principal. (R. 8, 16). 
William F. Wade and Erma M. Wade kept up 
the payments on the Conditional Sales Note (R. 31) 
until the principal amount was paid down to $4,568.07 
( R. 30), and kept up the payments on the Promissory 
Note to Jones (R. 31) until the principal on it was paid 
down to $550.00. ( R. 19) . 
On February 4, 1961, Lavine H. White took over 
the business from the ''T ades and as consideration there-
for entered into two agreements with the ''T ades. One 
agreement was to assume and pay off in full the Wade 
obligation on the said Conditional Sales Note owing to 
the Kidmans (R. 10) and the other agreement was to 
assume and pay off the ''T ade obligation on the Promis-
sory Note owing to Keith S. Jones. (R. 19). 
Lavine H. 'Vhite defaulted on both notes. (R. 31). 
In order to effect collection of the Conditional Sales 
Note the J{idmans brought this action against White, 
Jones and the ''rades. (R. 1-10). In order for Jones to 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
protect his interests and to effect collection of the 
J>romissory Note of \Vades to him, he brought a cross-
claim against \ \Thite and the \ \T ades. ( R. 15-19) . 
'fhe District l~ourt in a pre-trial hearing construed 
the t\\·o agreements of Lavine H. \Vhite to mean that 
she had assumed the\ \T ades' obligation on the two notes, 
including the penalties in the event she defaulted, and 
determined that she had no meritoriousc, defensJt to the 
aetion commenced to effect collection of the notes. The 
Court granted a Motion for Summary J udgment, 
holding all defendants liable to the l(idmans for the 
amount still owing on the Conditional Sales Note, to-
gether with interest and attorney's fees. The Court 
also granted Jones' motion for Summary Judgment, 
holding ''rhite and the Wades liable for the amount still 
o\ving on the Promissory Note, together with interest 
and attorney's fees. (R. 25-26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY 
INTERPRETED 'THE T\,rO AGREEMENTS 
OF LA VINE H. ''rHITE \VITH WILLIAM E. 
''r ADE AND ER~IA l\tl. "WADE. 
It appears to be Lavi11e H. White's contention 
that the two agreements hereinafter set forth in full 
merely obligated her to pay $4,568.07 at $100.00 per 
month, and $550.00 at $25.00 per month, whereas, it 
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was the judgment of the lower court and respondent's 
contention that she assumed the Wade obligations, 
which included the penalties provided in those obliga-
tions in the event she defaulted. The only part of the 
lower court's judgment that is being questioned is 
whether or not Lavine H. White is subject to the pro-
vision of acceleration, interest and attorney's fees 
provided in each of the two obligations she assumed. 
A. B 0 T H AGREEMENTS CLEARLY 
PROVIDE THAT LAVINE H. WHITE 
AGREED TO ASSUME THE WADES' 
OBLIGATION IN FULL AND NOT 
MERELY TO PAY A CERTAIN 
AMOUN'l, OF MONEY. 
The agreement with reference to the Conditional 
Sales Note owing to the Kidmans reads as follows: 
''In consideration of the trans£ er of all right, 
title and interest of ''TILLIAM E. 'VADE 
and ERMA M. 'VADE, his wife, in and to all 
personal property, located at 3325 South 2300 
East, Salt Lake County, Utah, I hereby agree 
to assume and pay off in full the obligation of 
William E. ''T ade and Erma l\1. ''r ade, to 
Woodbury Corporation (Mr. La\rere Kidman) 
in the amount of $4,568.07 at the rate of $100 
per month. Is/ Lavine H. White." (R. 10}. 
The agreement 'vith reference to the Promissory 
Note owing to Jones reads as follows: 
"In consideration of the trans£ er of all right, 
title and interest of ''TILLIAl\I E. 'VADE 
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and ER:\1..:\ :\I. ''r ADE, his 'vife, in and to all 
personal property located at 3325 South 2300 
East, Salt Lake County, Utah, I hereby agree 
to assume and pay off in full the obligation of 
'Villiam E. ''rade and Erma l\1. Wade, to Mr. 
Keith S. Jones, in the amount of $550.00 at the 
rate of $25 per month. 
/s/ Lavine H. vVhite." (R. 19). 
In both of the agreements it is clear and unambigu-
ous that Lavine H. White agreed to assume the Wade 
obligation. The a1nounts referred to in each agreement 
clearly indicate an attempt to give some identification 
of the obligation and was not an attempt to describe 
all of the terms of the obligation assumed. 
As a matter of grammatical construction, Lavine 
H. White agreed to assume and pay off in full the 
obligation of the Wades and not as appellant contends, 
that she agreed only to pay the amounts specified. If 
the agreements were only to pay certain amounts and 
not assume the obligation, the parties would have so 
indicated by appropriate language-for instance, "I 
agree to assume and pay the amount of ... " But when 
Lavine H. White agreed to assume and pay off in 
full the obligation, she 'vas obligated to do so, and was 
required to perform the obligation in accordance with 
the terms of the obligation, which not only require her 
to pay the outstanding amounts at the amounts per 
month specified, but also subjected her to the penalties 
provided in the obligation in the event she defaulted. 
She is the one 'vho defaulted and it was entirely her 
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own doings that brought the default provisions of both 
notes into play. 
It should be further noted that the parties used 
the word "and" between the word "assume" and the 
words "pay off," making it clear that Lavine H. White 
did not merely assume to pay off the amounts referred 
to, as contended by appellant, but agreed to assume 
and pay off in full the obligation. 
The amounts stated in each agreement stated the 
amounts understood by the parties to be presently 
owing on each obligation, and were not intended as a 
statement of the complete obligation assumed. Appel-
lant, by her strained interpretation of the agreements, 
claims that she is not even liable for the interest on the 
two notes. It is contrary to all common business sense 
to contend that th e Wades would give Lavine H. White 
possession of the property and have her pay only the 
principal on the property, and leave themselves obli-
gated to keep up the monthly interest payments. Both 
the terms of the agreement and common sense make 
it clear that Lavine H. White assumed the full obli-
gations of the 'Vades with reference to the property 
of which she took possession. 
B. BOTH AGREEMENTS CLEARLY RE-
FERRED TO ANOTHER INSTRU-
MENT. 'l~HEREFORE, THE ORIGI-
NAL AGREEMENT AND THE IN-
STRUMENT REFERRED TO MUST 
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BE CONSIDERED AND CONSTRUED 
AS ONE. 
The doctrine of Incorporation by Reference has 
been applied frequently 'vhen the courts have been 
called on to interpret a "\vritten instrument, and the two 
agreements the Court is now being called upon to con-
strue require this rule of construction to be applied. 
Both of the agreements of Lavine H. White clearly 
make reference to other instruments, and the rules of 
construction require that "effect must be given to writ-
ings incorporated in to the con tract by reference . . . '' 
Oberg v. City of I~os Angeles~ 132 C. App. (2nd) 151, 
281 Pac. (2d) 591, 596 ( 1955). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently stated 
this to be a proper rule of construction. In Miller v. 
Hancock~ 67 U. 202, 246 Pac. 949, 953, and in Mathis 
v. Madsen~ 1 U. (2nd) 46, 261 Pac. (2d) 952, 956, the 
Court stated: 
"Respondent cites cases to the effect that sepa-
rate writings may be construed together as con-
taining all the terms of a contract, though only 
one be signed by the party to be charged; (cit-
ing cases) . The doctrine of these cases is well-
nigh elementary. It is at least supported by the 
great weight of judicial opinion." 
This rule of construction has been stated in Bell 
v. Rio Grande Oil Co.~ 23 C. App. 2d 436, 73 Pac. (2d) 
662, 663 ( 1938), as follows: 
"A written agreement may, by reference ex-
pressly made thereto, incorporate other written 
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agreements; and in the event such incorporation 
is made, the original agreement and those re-
ferred to must be considered and construed as 
one." (Citing cases) . 
Other cases stating the same rule: Cerino v. Oregon 
Physicians Service_, 202 Ore. 474, 276 Pac. (2d) 397, 
401; Holbrook v. Fazio_, 84 C. App. (2d) 700, 191 
Pac. ( 2d) 26, 123. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in f!limate Control_, Inc. 
v. Hill_, 86 Ariz. 180, 342 Pac. (2d) 854, 859, has made 
it clear that the agreement need not specifically state 
the other instrument to be incorporated in the agree-
ment before the rule of incorporation by reference is 
applied, but mere reference to it is sufficient: 
" . . . it has long been settled, without a dis-
senting voice, that parties may incorporate into 
agreements by mere reference, other 'Yritings or 
agreements or records, and thereby make the 
latter an essential part of the contract." 
The Arizona Supreme Court made it clear in the 
same case that merely because a meaning can be given 
to a clause without considering the instrument referred 
to does not prevent the court as a matter of la'Y from 
construing the instrument referred to "Tith the signed 
agreement: 
"A judicial interpretation of a contract does 
not reach a point "There the meaning of so1ne 
clause can be said to be in doubt upon merely 
arriving at a conclusion that such clause may, as 
an abstract proposition~ be giYen either of t'Yo 
meanings. A clause in a contract~ if taken by 
10 
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itself, often adtnits of two meaning, when from 
the 'vhole contract there is no reasonable doubt 
as to the sense in which the parties use it." 
So it is with the interpretation of the two agree-
ments of La vine II. "rhite. It is possible to give a 
strained interpretation of what obligation was being 
assumed if the last part of the agreement is read sepa-
rately, but 'vhen the complete agreement is read it 
becomes clear that Lavine H. White was purchasing 
personal property and as consideration for that prop-
erty was assuming the obligations theW ades had under-
taken with reference to the property. 
Lavine H. White was not merely purchasing per-
sonal property and paying so much money for it, but 
rather she was buying personal property being used in 
a going business by taking possession of the property 
and assuming the obligations which went with possession 
and use of the property. Lavine H. White well knew 
the obligations that went with this personal property 
was a Conditional Sales Note O\ving to Kidmans and 
a Promissory Note owing to Jones, and she was not 
ignorant, nor has she at any time in these proceedings 
claimed to be ignorant of the contents of these two 
notes. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CON-
SIDER PAROL E ,~IDE N C E BUT CON-
11 
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STRUED THE AGREEMENTS AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
The appellant under Point II of her brief con-
tends that "the only logical way that the lower court 
could have reached its decision to include attorney's 
fees, an acceleration clause and interest in this contract 
was to admit parol evidence to further define the word 
"obligation." This inference and contention have no 
basis, but on the contrary the record clearly indicates 
that parol evidence was not considered. 
The pre-trial order clearly states the basis for the 
court's opinion. With reference to the obligation owed 
by Wades to Kidman, the Court stated: 
"Eugene Hansen, counsel for Mrs. 'Vhite, 
claimed defendant was not liable under said 
conditional sales note but the Court after review-
ing Exhibit (} of the amended coomplaint ruled 
as a matter of law that said defendant was bound 
by terms of said conditional sales note." (R. 25). 
Exhibit C is Lavine H. White's agreement to 
assume and pay off 'Vades' obligation to Kidman. (R. 
10). 
It is obvious from this statement by the Court in 
the pre-trial order that the Court applied the "incorpo-
ration by reference'' rule of construction and did not 
consider parol evidence. The Court's statement clearly 
states that "after revie,ving Exhibit C," meaning that 
it construed the contract as it was "~ritten. The Court 
states that after reYiewing Exhibit C it ruled as a matter 
12 
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of ht\V that Lavine H. ''rhite was bound by terms of 
said conditional sales note. In other words, Lavine H. 
\\'bite's agreement, as shown by Exhibit C, referred 
to the (\nalitional Sale Note in such a way that the 
terms of the Conditional Sale Note were incorporated 
hy reference into the agreement. 
\\rith reference to the Promissory Note owing to 
Jones, the l'1ourt stated in the pre-trial order the follow-
Ing: 
''Respecting the claim of Keith S. Jones vs. 
Lavine H. 'Vhite, wherein plaintiff seeks to re-
cover the sum of $550.00 and attorney's fees in 
the amount of $195.00, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 6ro per annum from March 
1, 1960, the Court held that she has no meritori-
ous defense to this claim. Therefore judgment 
is entered for said amount." (R. 26). 
This order by the District Court makes it clear 
that not only were the terms of the Promissory Note 
incorporated by reference into the agreement, but the 
Court determined as a matter of law that White has 
no meritorious defense to this claim. According to the 
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court in Whiti-ng 
Stoker Co. v. Chicago Stoker Corporation~ 171 Fed. 
(2d) 2~8, 251 (1949), this was a determination which 
the Court may properly make. 
"A possibility of doubt is not sufficient, for it 
is out of such possibilities that controversies arise. 
It is the duty of the court to ascertain by judicial 
interpretation, not whether a doubt may be as-
serted, but 'vhether any ambiguity really exists." 
(Citing cases). 
13 
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As stated by appellantj on Page 8 of her brief, 
quoting from Moore's Federal Practice, Section 56:15: 
"The function of a summary judgment is to 
avoid a useless trial . . . In ruling on a motion 
for a summary judgment the court's function 
is to determine whether such a genuine issue 
exists, not to resolve any existing factual issues." 
The pre-trial order clearly shows that the District 
Court determined that a trial would be useless because 
the contract was not ambiguous so as to require parole 
evidence, and that Lavine H. White had no meritorious 
defense to present at a trial. 
There is no indication in either the pre-trial order 
granting summary judgment or any other place in 
the record that any parole evidence was considered by 
the Court in construing the agreements of Lavine H. 
White. 
POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDG~IENT WAS PROPER 
BECAUSE THE AGREEl\IENTS 'VERE NOT 
AMBIGUOUS SO AS TO REQUIRE PAROLE 
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THEM AND 
LEVINE H. ''rHI'fE HAS NO l\IERITORIOUS 
DEFENSE. 
Merely because more than one interpretation can 
be claimed of an agreement is not sufficient to require 
the Court to proceed 'vith trial and hear parole evidence 
14 
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before eonstruing the agreement. "The question of 
\rhether an ambiguity exists is to be determined by 
the court as a question of la,v." 17 CJS 1287 . 
.t\.ccording to the holding in Whiting Stoker Co. 
v. Chicago Stoker (yorporation., 171 Fed. (2d) 248, 251 
( 1949) : 
"'A contract is ambiguous if~ and only if, it is 
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different con-
structions; it is not ambiguous if the court can 
determine its meaning without any guide other 
than a kno\\·ledge of the simple facts on which, 
from the nature of language in general, its mean-
ing depends. 17 C.J .S., Contracts, Sec. 294, and 
cases there cited. Contracts are not rendered 
a1nbiguous by the 1nere fact that the parties do 
not agree upon their proper construction. (Cit-
ing cases) . . . . A possibility of doubt is not 
sufficient, for it is out of such possibilities that 
controversies arise. It is the duty of the court to 
ascertain by judicial interpretation, not whether 
a doubt may be asserted, but whether any ambi-
guity really exists." (Citing cases) . 
The District Court has assumed its proper respon-
sibility in this case and determined whether or not any 
ambiguity exists in the two agreements. The Court has 
also assumed its proper responsibility in determining 
whether or not a 1neritorious defense exists and has 
determined that none exists. 
There is no ambiguity In the language of these 
t"·o agreements. The language is absolutely clear that 
Lavine H. ''Thite assumed the obligations the Wades 
15 
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owed to Kidmans and to Jones. The Wades had only 
one obligation to the Kidmans and only one obligation 
to Jones, and it is these two obligations that the District 
Court has ordered Lavine H. White responsible for. 
The law as stated in Terrill v. Laney~ 200 Okla. 
308, 193 Pac. ( 2d) 296, 300 ( 1948) , makes it clear that 
there are no grounds for a trial in this case. 
"The language used in a contract is to govern 
its interpretation and, if such language is clearly 
explicit and does not involve uncertainty, the 
words used are to be understood in their ordinary 
and proper sense, and, when the language is plain 
and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence as to its 
meaning is not admissible. In such situation, the 
construction of the contract is for the court and 
not the jury." 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the District 
Court has correctly assumed its responsibility of deter-
mining whether or not the two agreements of Lavine 
H. White were ambiguous. Further, the Court has 
properly determined that no ambiguity exists and has 
applied correct rules of construction in making an in-
terpretation of the agreements, giving the proper Swn-
mary Judgment against Lavine H. ''rhite in conform-. 
ance with the plain meaning of the two agreements. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Therefore the District l"ourt's Summary Judgments 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~IcKAY r\ND BURTON 
BARRIE G. McKAY 
Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
THOMASVUYK 
53 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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